The current state of preparedness is very low for AAD and it would require strong leadership at the decision-making level to steer the ship of modernisation to its logical end
Security environment in South Asia is bleak, with Afghanistan and Pakistan struggling to establish the rule of law amidst a sea of terrorist violence. The present regime in Bangladesh is moder-ate and in favour of India but one cannot predict when the tables are turned. Nepal is also struggling to achieve internal stability. China has recently become quite aggressive, probably telling India not to forget 1962. The internal environment is also dominated by Naxalite violence which was allowed to fester for long to reach such a level of intensity. The events of 26/11 have shaken the country and achieving coastal security has become the holy grill. For all you may know that the next terrorist attack may be from the air. After all, the threat perception during January 26 and August 15 celebrations in Delhi were based on suicide missions with microlite aircraft which was much before 9/11.
In such an environment, it is essential the armed forces remain prepared for all eventualities and modernisation is one key ingredient of preparation. However, army modernisation, and in particular Army Air Defence (AAD) modernisation, remains grounded, caught in a web of indigenisation, and Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) projects, and proce-dures. A brief review will justify the forego-ing statement.
Guns Systems
L70 Gun System: AAD inherited L60 gun of Second World War vintage in 1947, which was replaced by L70 gun system. During the early 1960s, this was a fairly modern system with its own fire control radar for night firing and it took almost two decades to transform the complete L60 inventory into L70. Meanwhile, the DRDO started the development of an AD gun which was to replace L70 however after many twists and turns lasting over two decades the project failed and was shelved. AAD now started looking at the global market for replacement but it appeared that guns were going out of flavour and pos-sible choice narrowed down to Skyshield of Rheinmetall Defence which has an effec-tive range of 4 km and rate of fire of 1,000 rounds per minute. It can be matched with any fire control radar and the most redeeming feature is the Ahead (advance hit efficiency and destruction technology) ammunition. It contains 152 heavy tung-sten metal, spin stabilised sub-projectiles and ejected by a time fuse. Since it led to a single vendor situation thus it is likely that the process will be repeated and a fresh Request for Proposal is issued causing a delay of a couple of years. Meanwhile, the L70 gun will shortly celebrate its 50th anni-versary much to glee of some of our hos-tile neighbours. Suppose the future gun’s induction starts in 2015 then to change the whole inventory may take another 20 years and notionally if the gun remains current for another 20 years, which brings us to 2055. This is a mind boggling and unimagi-nable time frame. Unless some drastic action is taken, L70 may die of old age without leaving a successor.
23mm Twin Gun: This is a highly mobile light gun with a high rate of fire of 2,000 rounds/min and eminently suited for the field army but it is purely a mechanical gun thus has become obsolete to meet the cur-rent and future threat specially with respect to unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which are going to proliferate at battalion and bri-gade level. Adding a fire control radar will only make it heavier, but giving it a power drive and a modern optronic sight will more than foot the bill at reasonable cost. Such an upgradation project has been going on for the last decade or so with BEL and hope that it succeeds soon. Finally, it will be most cost effective to have a common successor to L70 and 23mm Twin Gun.
Schilka: This is a self-propelled gun system, having a fire control radar and a very high rate of fire of 3,400 rounds/min with its four barrels. It is ideally suited for supporting mechanised forces and, after 35 years of ser-vice, it has become obsolete. Its successor was Tanguska and one regiment worth equip-ment was imported but for some unexplained reason no further procurement was carried out. There is a requirement for finding a suit-able replacement which ideally could be the latest version of Tanguska or try to mount L70’s successor on a suitable platform.
